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I. INTRODUCTION
Academic legal thought might be more concentratedly self-
critical than it usually is. We, its producers, could and should learn
to be more habitually reflective
-about the social, cultural, and political conditions in which
we produce our thought;
-about whether or how, in these conditions, it makes sense
for us to cast our scholarship as arguments for or against
any particular aspect of social practice or state of the social
world;
-about precisely how-at what levels of ideology, choice, and
action-we understand our evaluative scholarship to extricate
itself from whatever it is we mean to be contending against;
-about precisely how-at what levels of ideology, choice, and
action-we imagine that our scholarship might work to move
the world closer to whatever it is we mean to be contending
for.
Not only might we acquire the habits and skills of such reflec-
tion, we ought to work on doing so. Such is the critical idea
animating the symposium contributions from Professors Delgado,'
Schlag, 2 and Winter.3 We think it is a serious and sensible claim.
t MargaretJane Radin is Professor of Law, Stanford University. Frank Michelman
is Professor of Law, Harvard University. Thanks to Regina Austin, Jack Balkin,
Richard Delgado, Jerry Frug, Thomas Grey, Deborah Rhode, Fred Schauer, Pierre
Schlag, Gerald Torres, and Steven Winter for their comments and criticisms.
1 See Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal
Though 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1991).
2 See Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REv 801 (1991)
[hereinafter Schlag, Politics of Form].
3 See Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Legal Practice 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 963 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, Contingency]. A like idea appears in previous
writings of Schlag and Winter. See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L.
REV. 167 (1990) [hereinafter Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go]; Winter,
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We mostly agree with it, and we find much that is compelling in the
diagnoses offered by our cosymposiasts.
We do not agree, however, that it is especially helpful as part of
the effort to advance an understanding of legal thought's situation
and prospects
-to name "normativity" as legal thought's crucially problem-
atic characteristic; or
-to set up rationalistic, monistic "grand theory"4 -rigged of
abstractive-deductive reasoning;5 armed with compulsive
moralizing prescriptions; 6 girded by moral complacency,
7
defensiveness,8 and self-enclosure;9 and anchored in intellec-
tual nalvet6l°-as the paradigm of problematically normative
legal thought.
A. Normativity as the Problem
"'What should we do? What should the law be? What do you
propose?'... asks normative legal thought."11 Normative, we thus
understand, is what every prescriptive utterance is; normativity
marks every saying addressed to a question of what someone should
(or should not) do. Now, it seems obviously correct that normativ-
ity, thus sweepingly defined, is pandemic in legal thought and
writing. But so is it pandemic, we would say, in thought and writing
about legal thought-as represented, say, by the articles in this
symposium.
Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CALiF. L. REv. 1441
(1990).
4 Delgado, supra note 1, at 934; see also Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at
824-25, 839-40, 875-76, 879, 894-95, 899-901.
' See Delgado, supra note 1, at 960; Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note
3, at 170 ("While not necessarily deductive in structure," normative thought based on
an "abstract value" like equality "typically suffers from the same problem found in
deductive legal thought.... [I1n the movement from the abstract to the concrete, the
mediations between the two are either not to be found, or they are ... utterly
unconvincing").
6 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 935; Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note
3, at 175 n.23 , 178.
7 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 936.
8 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at 180-82 & n.41.
' See id. at 176; Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 823-24.
10 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 936; Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra
note 3, at 175; Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 852, 874-77.
11 Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at 177; see also Schlag, Politics
of Form, supra note 2, at 802, 835-39.
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To work, in writing, at the displacement or destabilization of
some named practice of writing (like normative legal thought)12 is
already to exemplify and thereby to commend some different, some
critically chastened, practice.18 Moreover, it is extremely difficult
to carry on the work of destabilization without appearing to lapse
into normative modes of discourse. Take, for example, this passage
from an article by Schlag:
[This [talk-talk genre] simply argues that we should talk [some]
new talk.... Variations on this old talk/new talk include the
following: we should talk ... more normatively, [or] more
contextually ... [etc.] or in that hopeful humanist way until we
figure out what the hell we're doing up here 30,000 feet from
earth arguing about how we should land.
4
"We should talk more normatively" (WSTMN, for short) is the name
of a certain sentence-the one that says we should talk more
normatively. If uttering WSTMN is contemptible as just talk or as
normative talk (and, to boot, as naively presupposing that how we
talk, what we do, is within our power to decide15), then what is a
reader supposed to make of the sentence that says that uttering
WSTMN is contemptible on those grounds? It seems that saying
that cannot (coherently) be an argument about whether or how we
should (or should not) talk. How can one argue that what makes an
utterance (or a genre) unworthy of attention or respect is that it is
normative talk? To argue is to invoke the practice of argument, and
that practice consists of normative talk. (Maybe you could try by
some other means to remove that practice from society's repertoire,
but you can't well do that by arguing about it.) But if this utterance
of Schlag's is not argument, then what is it?
We believe that too many in the community to whom these
writings are addressed will see Schlag here doing the very thing his
utterance says should not be done-arguing prescriptively-and so
charge him with a lapse of logic or consistency. We think such a
charge would be too hasty. Schlag has not only been the first in
these pages to call attention to the issue, he has been explicitly (and
12 See e.g., Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 932 ("[This article] is... in the
nature of an attempt to help destabilize normative legal thought.").
13 See id. ("[W]hat should we do? This question arrives.., too late .... We've
been doing it since the beginning of this article .... trying to show a whole series of
[normative routines] ... off the jurisprudential stage.").
14 Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at 171.
15 See id.
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helpfully) attentive to the delicacy of his position as an ardent
assailant of normativity in scholarship. 16 He directs our attention
to the ubiquity and pertinacity of the problem he perceives.
17
That ubiquity and that pertinacity, however, set rhetorical traps
that we're not sure have been avoided. The issue, we emphasize, is
not logic; it is rhetoric. ]Xt is in the coin of persuasion that the
question of the "logic" of Schlag's position finally pays. In the
prevailing discourse of academics and intellectuals, "logic" functions
as what Wittgenstein calls a "philosophical superlative";1 8 our use of
the term here signifies that, try as they might, readers will find it
difficult to see Schlag's position as other than self-contradictory.
What accordingly strikes us is the rhetorical futility of argumenta-
tively tying legal scholarship's failures of critical self-consciousness
and methodological reflectiveness to its undeniable, but seemingly
inexpungible, trait of normativity. For, even if by dint of great
concentration we can occasionally and fleetingly glimpse a different
possibility, normative moments do seem irrepressible from what any
of us ever does as legal scholar, whether our study be first-order, of
"law," or second-order, of "legal thought." To this issue we shall
return in Part II and then again at the closing of this Comment.
B. Grand Theory as the Paradigm
A paradigm is a core case. It is also a regulative model.
Unmistakably, it seems to us, grand theory19 stands out as the core
case of normative legal thought as that thought's critics present it.
This is not surprising, given the critics' explanatory observation that
grand theory today stands as the regulative model for legal thought
in general. 20 The critics are suggesting that all legal thought feels
cultural pressure to measure its adequacy, as legal thought, against
16 See Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 925 (pleading confession and
avoidance to charge of "performative contradiction"); infra note 125 and accompany-
ing text.
17 See, e.g., Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at 174 n.18 ("'[W]e
can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already had to slip
into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to
contest.'" (quotingJ. DERRIDA, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences, in WRrTNG AND DIFFERENCE 280 (A. Bass trans. 1978))).
18 L. WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 192 (G. Anscombe trans.
1968).
19 See supra notes 4-10 and accompanying text.
20 See Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 821, 843-47; Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1105, 1206-24 (1989).
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the norm of grand theory; and that this goes far to explain the
invasion of all legal thought by relentless and, as they believe,
incontinent prescriptivity.
21
Again, our quarrel is not with the insight, but with the rhetoric
the insight apparently prompts. Predominantly rationalistic/
prescriptive constructions of current legal-scholarly practice may
still today be descriptively apt, and they do certainly direct attention
to some important kinds of scholarly lapses from effective critical
engagement with the world. Such constructions can also, however,
deflect attention from other important kinds of lapses. They seem
relatively blind to dangers of footloose atheoreticality, 22 impotent
particularism,23 complacent conventionalism, or traditionalism,
24
and demobilizing self-suspicion.25 These latter kinds of dangers
also plague some important varieties of normativity found in
contemporary legal scholarship.
For purposes of critical insight and incision, the field of legal
thought contains-arguably-not one normativity, but many norma-
tivities. The styles of scholarly activity that currently and colloquial-
ly fall under the heading of normative legal thought are diverse and
in some respects incompatible. A partial listing, contrived for our
own purposes here, would include the normative jurisprudences of
autonomous doctrinal elaboration ("the artificial reason" of the
law26), instrumentalist economics,27 rights and principles,2 8 dia-
logism,29  poststructuraism, °  pragmatism, l feminism,3 2  and
21 See Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 822-24, 835-38.
2 See infra note 104.
2 See infra text accompanying notes 103-04.
24 See infra notes 105-110 and accompanying text.
2 See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.26 Fried, The Artfficial Reason of the Law or What Lawyers Know, 60 TEX. L. REv. 35,
39 (1981); see infra text accompanying notes 56-57.27 See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 63-85 and accompanying text. Under this heading, we would
include both modern self-styled natural-law jurisprudential work, see, e.g., J. FINNIs,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980), and much of the modern jurisprudence
of "interpretation," see; e.g., R. DwoRKIN, LAW's EMPIRE (1986).
2 By dialogicjurisprudences, we mean those concerned with defining the social
and institutional conditions under which laws issuing from collective dialogic
("political") interactions deserve recognition as legitimate "self-government." See infra
notes 86-97 and accompanying text.
50 For now, readers can identify poststructuralism with the "deconstructive"
method recently familiar in some "cls" attacks on other normative jurisprudences.
Later, in Part III, we willjustify putting poststructuralism on a plane with the others.
See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Some readers may wonder about the
absence ofpostmodernism from this list, or indeed may identify postmodernism with
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critical race theory.3 3 Rhetorically treating all these jurisprudential
practices as satellites of grand theory risks repelling or excusing too
many normative practitioners from debates that ought to concern
them.
II. THE UBIQUITY OF THE NORMATIVE
Consider legal positivism. It might be thought that legal
positivism is the aspiration to legal thought without normativity
3 4
Legal positivism certainly is the tradition of insistence on screening
value judgments out of law-finding, law-interpreting, and law-
applying. The positivist tradition's initial motivating impulse was,
and it remains, the demand to distinguish the law that is politically
enacted from the moral law (whatever it is) that may or not be so
enacted. "Whether it be or not be is one enquiry; whether it be or
not be conformable to an -assumed standard, is a different enqui-
ry."35
For Austin and Bentham, the motivation was progressive.3 6 In
order to be able to change the law for the better, first we had to be
able to realize that there can be laws, and moreover that laws can be,
independent of their being good or bad. Only thus could we have
any hope of standing apart from the law so as to criticize and if
necessary try to change it. Thus for Austin and Bentham (as more
recently for Hart 37), reform is the motive for cordoning valuational
judgment away from the study of law as we find it.38 The central
poststructuralism (deconstruction). While postmodernism may be something of a
contested concept right now, in this essay we will use the term in a broad sense to
cover those styles of thought sharing philosophical commitments to anti-foundational-
ism, immanence, historicity, and epistemic political struggle. (Some writers also use
pragmatism as the umbrella to signify this complex of commitments.) As they are
practiced now, poststructuralism and pragmatism are postmodernistjurisprudences,
as (largely) are feminism and critical race theory. See infra text accompanying notes
101-102.
31 See infra notes 104-11 and accompanying text.
32 See infra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
33 See infra notes 118-24 and accompanying text.
34 Delgado imagines his readers wondering whether "law without normativity
[would] perhaps decline into positivism." Delgado, supra note 1, at 937.
35 J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 184 (1954).
36 H.L.A. Hart has detailed the elements of positivism in the thought of Bentham
and Austin, whom he placed among "the architects of great reforms" of the
nineteenth century. See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
HARv. L. REV. 593, 594-600 (1958).37 Id. at 621, 628-29.
38 Cf. Delgado, supra note 1, at 959-60 ("Law might become, almost, a branch of
CRITICAL LEGAL PRACTICE
teaching of their combined works is that reform is disenabled if the
legal status quo is imagined as normatively ordained just by virtue
of its being the status quo; and, conversely, reform is disenabled if
the status quo becomes unidentifiable, a moving target . la
Heisenberg ceaselessly yanked around by the values of its observ-
ers.
9
In seeking to stand apart from law's normativity, the classical
positivists were prompted by desire for reform. Thus, were the
critics here aspiring to be our generation's neo- (or super-) legal
positivists, they would have to notice that legal positivist aims (on
our understanding of those aims), are ultimately normative (on the
critics' broad understanding of the normative). Legal positivists
contend that it will be better for us to put aside the mythology of
law's inexorable convergence on the good and the right and so we
ought to do so-not merely in the academic interest of clear thought,
but in the social interest of justice and good government. Progres-
sive positivism expects that when we do ascertain what a law is, we
are going to exercise upon it' our valuational judgment and act
accordingly.
We won't press this suggestion too far. Contemporary legal
positivisms do not always carry the nineteenth-century progressive
motivation. Today, it is often conservatism that prompts insistence
on separating questions of legal content from questions of value.
For some conservative positivists, 40 the aim is surely sometimes
that of entrenching a normatively preferred, legal-doctrinal status
quo against disruption by ideologically deviant reformist judges.
41
hematology. We might begin to notice things like beggars or the countless other
wounded that our system throws up. We might focus for the first time on subsistence
claims, appreciate the dance between huge bureaucracies and those they serv(ic)e."
(footnotes omitted)).
39 Thus,
the ostrich does not get rid of her enemy by hiding her head in the sand.
Slavery is not abolished, although we have persuaded ourselves that it has
no right to exist.... The Constitution will never be amended by persuad-
ing men that it does not need amendment. National evils are only cured by
holding men's eyes open, and forcing them to gaze on the hideous reality.
W. PHILLIPS, A REVIEW OF LYSANDER SPOONDER'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF SLAVERY
3-4 (1847), quoted in R. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 154 (1975).
40 See e.g., Meese, Perspective on the Authoritativeness of Supreme Court Decision: The
Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979 (1987).
41 Cf Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 825 (noting that technical
doctrinalists' criticisms of normative jurisprudence turn out to be "criticisms of
particular normative orientations"). Ironically, this entrenchment of the status quo
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For others,42 insistence on law/value separation is rhetorically
oriented towards the values connoted by the ideal of the Rule of
Law, values that they claim are (at least partially) independent of
legal content. Rule of Law values such as consistency, calculability,
democracy, and official accountability depend, these conservative
positivists say, on habits of respect for the fixed and "objective"
character of legal content, as opposed to the variability and
"subjectivity" believed to inhere in judgments of moral value.43
Thus they moralize against moralistic judges, who can subvert the
Rule of Law by bringing to bear "their own subjective values" under
the guise of adjudication.
If, despite their name and rhetoric, legal positivisms are
irredeemably normative, what about contemporary legal anti-
positivisms? Do anti-positivists-can they-get beyond normativity?
As do their positivist counterparts, anti-positivists assume a variety
of stances. Some deplore the refuge from conscience that positivist
rhetoric offers to legal actors, arguing that this rhetoric allows
decisionmakers an escape from personal responsibility for the flesh-
and-blood consequences of their actions. Positivism, they say,
encourages resort to mechanical jurisprudence 44 and elevates the
myth of legalism, or the virtue of fidelity to law-as-such, above and
beyond ordinary moral consciousness.4 5 Less apparently moralis-
tic are the modern anti-positivisms that proceed from philosophical
or anthropological refutations of certain premises on which legal
positivism's argument depends. The premises denied are what we
may call separationist: that we can possibly hold separate from one
another the activities of laying down ("making") the law, construing
and following ("applying") the law, and criticizing ("evaluating") the
law.
We can subdivide these separation-denying anti-positivisms
according to their respective theories of inseparability. Some trace
is just what the nineteenth-century progressive positivists were fighting against.
42 See, e.g., Scalia, The Rule of.Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
4 See, e.g., Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1625-29 (1988);
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross-Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings,
88 CoLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1682-83 (1988). These conservative positivists thus focus
on what we called the Heisenberg problem. Seesupra note 39 and accompanying text.
44 See Delgado, supra note 1, at 942-43; cf. Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in the Age
of Balancing 96 YALE L.J. 943, 952, 962-63 (1987) ("The social science-like
methodology of balancing instructed the judge to look for values 'out there'" in
society.).
45 See R. COVER, supra note 39, at 150-54; Delgado, supra note 1, at 942-43.
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the impossibility of separation to human nature. They say that as
embodied, thoughtful, reflective, socially situated beings we cannot
avoid, or suppress from our law-saying pursuits, certain specific
intuitions or convictions regarding good, evil, right and wrong.
46
When such is the claim, a modern natural-law project is brewing--
not what anyone within earshot would call non-normative.
But consider another, arguably deeper, variety of separation-
denial. What of those (we are among them) who philosophically
(small p) deny the very possibility of finally separating from one
another the moments of cognition, imagination, evaluation, and
articulate rendition of any social or intersubjective production,
including law; or who deny the very possibility of holding quite
separate our communicative acts of description, criticism, and
prescription; and who deny, too, the very possibility of immunizing
any of these moments from strong, cultural transmission? These
denials raise questions not only for legal positivism but also for the
kinds of natural-law projects that have customarily been pitted
against it. In that sense, they are more than an anti-positivism. But
can we go all the way and say they are non-normative? Can their
utterers claim them as non-normative refutations not just of legal
positivism and natural law, but of the possibility of any descriptive,
prescriptive, or critical utterance seriously worth attempting or
attending?
They can't successfully be claimed as that, because people
listening can't seriously take them as that. When taken seriously,
construed as communication, these philosophical separation-denials
are themselves contentious utterances demanding attention. How
can people hear them as denouncing the practice of soliciting, by
contentious utterance, some change in practice?
Most importantly, all of these philosophical denials are utteranc-
es bound by their own (loosely speaking) postmodernist understand-
ings of language, knowledge, power, value, and their interconnec-
tions. According to these postmodernist understandings, knowledge
and power are interfused, and so are knowledge and value,
knowledge and imagination, power and value, value and imagina-
tion, imagination and power. The fusing medium is language.
There is no power-free language. There is, finally, no non-norma-
tive utterance. There are only kinds and degrees of normativity.
46 See e.g., J. FINNIS, supra note 28, at 81-97.
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III. SOME CRITIQUES O NORMATIVITIES IN LEGAL THOUGHT
A. Practice and Privilege
We have already expressed our doubt that it is helpful, for
purposes of the kinds of critiques of scholarship found in this
symposium, to lump together, as normative, the various styles of
activity currently manifest in written productions that are conven-
tionally recognized as legal scholarship. For purposes of perspicu-
ous critique, the field of scholarship, of writing, now marked as
"legal" displays not one but many normativities.
Any listing will be contestable. None will describe a strict
taxonomy of styles or projects, mutually exclusive and jointly
exhaustive. (Our understanding of language practices would not
allow for such an achievement.) But just in order to see how the
work of unpacking might go, take the list we've already offered of
eight normative jurisprudences: thejurisprudences of autonomous
doctrinal elaboration, instrumentalist economics, rights and
principles, dialogism, posts tructuralism, pragmatism, feminism, and
critical race theory. Grant us the license of treating these, for now,
as "our" legal normativities. 47 Is there some distinct critical stance
47 Let us here briefly mention some absentees from the list.
Public choice: We would regard instrumentally oriented work on public choice as a
branch of instrumentalist economics whose (Hobbesian) anthropological premises it
shares. What of descriptive or "positive" work in these modes, in contradistinction
to intentionally instrumentalist or 'normative" varieties? Whatever may be said of the
conceptual viability of rigid fact-value distinctions, we would not deny the possibility
of relatively nonprescriptive studies of law. In practice, however, we haven't seen,
and don't anticipate seeing, many economics-inspired legal studies that lack a strong
normative twist or inflection. See Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the Economic
Analysis of Law, 62 MINN. L. RiV. 1015, 1031-32 (1978) (discussing normative
tendencies in ostensibly positive scholarship); cf Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go,
supra note 3, at 172-73 (noting tendency of scholarship to hear the Zeitgeist speaking
through it).
Legal realism: We understand it to be a mixture of positivist empiricism and early
pragmatist instrumentalism; in this essay, we concentrate on its spiritual successors,
the various kinds of contemporary critiques of the mythologies and mystifications
holding together the legal status quo.
Law-and-society: In more traditional versions, its basic commitments are those of legal
realism; in more modern versions, it coalesces with modern pragmatism.
Republicanism: We would say that recent normative jurisprudential essays on "civic
republicanism," see generally The Civic Republican Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988),
partake, in varying mixtures, of the jurisprudences of dialogism and of rights and
principles.
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(discourse, practice) that is aptly generalizable, as anti-normative, to
all of these jurisprudential frameworks? We doubt it.
Some may object that we have already sabotaged the inquiry by
(mis)locating poststructuralism as a normative "jurisprudence" on
a plane with the others. By that move, the objection would run, we
fend off recognition that poststructuralism is the anti-normative,
anti-legal, critical stance (discourse, practice), we profess to be
seeking. In older terms, we would be charged with a category
mistake; in newer terms, we would be charged with failing to
privilege poststructuralism.
48
Our answer to that sort of objection is already contained in the
objection's demand for a privilege, indeed an undislodgeable,
privileged privilege. Postmodernists, we think, are committed not
only to the view that at any moment some stance must be privileged,
but to the view that it could be any available stance and that no
privilege is stabilized against dislodgment.49 If there can be no
Law-and-literature: It is best conceived, we suggest, not as a separate normative style,
but as a congeries of various normative styles in which practitioners draw material
and inspiration from literature and literary studies.
Postmodernism: As we explained earlier, see supra note 30, we understand post-
modernism in a broader sense than poststructuralism, to refer to a set of understand-
ings common to pragmatism and poststructuralism, and (largely) also to feminism and
critical race theory.
48 Pierre Schlag has said that
[i]f traditional legal discourse succeeds in transforming deconstruction into
just another technique, just another theoiy, just another method for making
arguments, ... [d]econstruction will become powerless to subvert and
displace the categorial regime in force precisely because it will have become
subsumed with that very same categorial regime-the one that systematically
transforms intellectual endeavors into just another technique,just another
theory,just another method.... But to transform deconstruction into any
of these things is to turn deconstruction into preciselywhat it seeks to resist
and displace. To transform deconstruction into a theoly, etc. is to relocate
deconstruction and confine it to the already inscribed logocentric matrices
of traditional legal thought.... The error here is the homogenization and
neutralization of the different subversiveness of deconstruction through its
assimilation with approaches that have already been reduced to the status
of mere theories, techniques, methods, etc.
Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moil.• The Politics of Form and the Domestication of
Deconstruction, 11 CARDOzO L. REv. 1631, 1636-37 (1990); cf. Schlag, Normative and
Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, 169 n.7 (observing that adherents of "fundamentalist"
(i.e., value-choice oriented) conceptions of politics tend to "miss" the political point
of "postmodernism" precisely because postmodernism's point is "to decenter and
displace this traditional conception of politics").
49 So if we have a disagreement with Schlag here, it isn't with his warning about
deconstruction's loss of critical bite when reduced to a mere "method" that one
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privilege over privileges, then the claim for a privileged status vis-a'-
vis the other "jurisprudences," as critique of them all rather than
fellow target of criticism, is no less available to any other "jurispru-
dence" on our list than it is to poststructuralism. To claim
otherwise-to insist on a privilege over privileges-would be to
restore a foundation. Poststructuralism, rejecting foundations, here
joins pragmatism:50 which stance stands as critique and which
others stand as targets is always and strictly a matter of (i) occasion
or focus, and (ii) perspective or interest; it is not a fixed or stable
matter of conceptual structure or logical inference.
In what remains of this essay, we will play out the diversity of
legal normativities as seen from both poststructuralist and pragma-
tist critical stances. Three cautions, before we proceed:
First: Under pressures of exposition, we set up ideal-types of
poststructuralism and pragmatism. We try, however, not to think
of these isms as ever in practice separate and mutually exclusive.
We try to see them always as. different moments in a critical practice
that requires both.
Second. We also see the two as different philosophical tempera-
ments or frames of mind. We do not, however, think of these
different temperaments as exclusively inhabiting different people.
Specifically, we are not seeing ourselves as "pragmatists" jousting
with other symposiasts here whom we see as "poststructuralists."
We speak for and against both stances. When we have an identified
exemplar in mind of one or another tendency, we name the
exemplar.
Third: We do, however, work harder here to explain prag-
matism's contribution to legal-scholarly critical practice than we do
poststructuralism's contribution. We emphasize more the deficien-
cies of the poststructuralist moment neglecting the pragmatist than
those of the pragmatist moment neglecting the poststructuralist.
That is because, as matters stand today, explaining pragmatism is
.applies," to (say) the resolution of legal issues or the criticism of legal discourses.
We simply want to resist any suggestion that the other (normative, legal) discourses
are stuck in the subordinated (disprivileged, supplementary) position of "mere
techniques, methods." We want to insist on dangerous supplementarity, on
flippability. See, e.g., Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 743,
755-61 (1987) (explaining deconstructivist notions of reversibility of privilege and
(dangerous) supplementarity). We want to insist that the other discourses can also
be thought in the privileged position of critical stance or practice.
50 As it will again; and again; and again .... See infra notes 73-85, 91-100, & 125
and accompanying text.
CRITICAL LEGAL PRACTICE
the harder and more urgent work. In today's legal-academic discus-
sions, pragmatism is the less developed and spongier term. If,
today, you call your legal-scholarly work deconstruction, you run a
real risk of getting nailed for either misuse of the term or miscon-
duct of the practice. Calling your work pragmatist runs you no such
risk, but does run you another: pragmatism still tends to get
dismissed as a buzzword or a poor excuse for thought. "We are all
poststructuralists now" may start a row. "We are all pragmatists
now" merely gets you a yawn. We are out to change that, in part by
investigating the interaction of poststructuralism and pragmatism.
B. Poststructuralists and Pragmatists: Ideal-Types
The poststructuralist moment in critical practice is conceptual,
diagnostic, and global. It fastens on intellectual structures and
denies their analytic probity. It indicts whole discourses and all
their works by showing their conceptual, categorical frameworks in
a state of collapse. In the poststructuralist frame of mind, we search
for dialectical fault lines implanted in discursive frameworks. We
deflate argumentative paradigms built around a characteristic set
(one for each target jurisprudence) of categories, distinctions, and
oppositions. We show their failures of closure-perhaps by exposing
addiction to a "fundamental contradiction," 51 perhaps by exposing
tactics of recursion and deferral.52
The pragmatist moment in critical practice is, by contrast,
empirical, epidemiological, and local. It notices characteristic kinds
of errors or biases that recur when target discourses are deployed
by nonideal-incompletely committed and assiduous-practitioners
caught in specific cultural environments. 53 The pragmatically
minded critic does not deny or ignore conceptual instability.
Neither does she hold that conceptual instability per se discredits a
framework. Indeed, she does not especially care to discredit any
discourse intrinsically or holistically. She rather seeks to evaluate
the discourse in use (given its conceptual instabilities) by ordinarily
complacent, culturally bound practitioners. She asks, for example,
about the tendency of the discourse, in its cultural setting, to focus
51 See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209,
211-13 (1979).
52 See Schlag, CannibalMoves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses ofthe LegalDistinction,
40 STAN. L. REV. 929, 961 (1988); see also Dalton, An Essay in the Deconstruction of
Contract Doctrine, 94 YALE LJ. 977 (1985).
'3 For the record: We are all nonideal; we are all incomplete; we are all lazy.
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on some problems and blur others. Pragmatically successful critique
does not necessarily mean that practitioners give up use of the
framework. It may mean, rather, that they watch out and correct
for biases to which the culturally situated framework is prone.
For purposes of the illustrative discussions to follow, consider
four strains in the prevailing intellectual culture of contemporary
America: (i) formalist, disposed to hinge the possibility of cogency
in argument or judgment (concerning truth and error, right and
wrong) to "pre-established, noncontroversial criteria;"54 (ii)
legalist, disposed to think that power strictly directed by fixed,
general rules is categorically safer, more benign, than power
entrusted to exercises of situated judgment; (iii) privatist, disposed
to regard "exercises" of state power as categorically more dangerous
to freedom and welfare than "contests" of private or market powers;
and (iv) capitalist, disposed to locate value in exchange, as price.55
1. Autonomous Doctrinalism
Our own discussion of legal positivism, above,5 6 intimates the
poststucturalist moment in critique of autonomous doctrinalism.
We attack as untenable certain dichotomies on which that jurispru-
dence rears itself: for example, "following" vs. "making" law, or
Rule of Law vs. personal rule. If such an attack were a terminus in
thought, then critique would end by proposing, explicitly or
implicitly, rejection of doctrinal argument from serious legal work.
If, however, critical practice also contains a pragmatic side, then
while we will not deny that the conceptual structures of doctrinalist
discourse are liable to collapse, we will allow that we might often be
able, in practice, to maintain a local, working separation among our
senses of (i) "the rules," (ii) "the facts," and (iii) the ends to be
served. That working separation might or might not be enough to
allow for appreciably consistent and purposive rule application. We
have to look and see. The pragmatic moment is that of bracketing
possibility and looking at. practice. In that practice we look,
pragmatically, for characteristic errors and biases. Perhaps we
observe how, in a dominantly legalist and privatist cultural environ-
ment, judicial doctrinalists tend in practice to find rule application
54 Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 893.
55 Or, more generally, reductionist, disposed to think that reasoned decision
requires a common measure for all matters in contention.
56 See supra text following note 34.
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too simple. Perhaps we see them often failing to work all the way
through the mazes and hierarchies of rules in a mature legal order,
to the point of laying bare the order's unresolved conflicts and gaps;
or we see them refusing to legislate in the gaps as Hart urges they
should forthrightly do. 57 Doctrinalists are thus too often too
quick, the pragmatist critic may end by saying, to deny responsibility
for moral outrage on the ground that their hands are tied.
2. Instrumentalist Economics
The normative jurisprudences of economics tend to be reduc-
tionist, conceiving of all things people value as monetizable,
commensurable in the currency of demand, and they tend to be
formalist, treating allocative efficiency-wealth maximization-as the
organizing end of social ordering by law. These two commitments
structure a conceptual field that lends itself to easy deconstruction:
one simply points out that (i) a system of legal rules can be
adjudged wealth-maximizing only relative to a given configuration
of demand; (ii) configurations of demand are conceptually indistinct
from distributions of wealth; and (iii) distributions of wealth are
what legal rule choices determine.
Critiques of normative economic jurisprudence move out in
various ways from this central analytical collapse to contend that
economic analysis can do no more than provide a cover of legitima-
cy to political choices otherwise decided.58 They show that the
economically prescribed system of legal rules depends on the
arbitrary order in which particular rules are taken up for consider-
ation. Or they show that the prescription for any rule of law
depends on an arbitrary assumption about which way the rule (or
the "entitlement" it controls) is already hypothetically set; or,
alternatively, it depends on whether we measure willingness to pay
by what one would "offer" to acquire the entitlement or by what one
57 See Hart, supra note 36, at 600.
5 8 See, e.g., Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
STAN. L. REV. 387,388 (1981) (noting that to use economic analysis we have to make
value judgments that are political).
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would "ask" in exchange for parting with it.59 Such is the work of
poststructuralist critical moments.
In one respect, a pragmatist inflection will tend to make critique
more accommodationist. Perhaps, rather than simply decry the
conceptual shambles of the whole question of efficiency in entitle-
ment, we pragmatically look at this or that entitlement specifically
at issue and ask how destabilizingly large a fraction of wealth
(demand) its assignment controls. At any rate, we would not
without looking insist that "the offer-asking problem" cannot ever,
in practice, be managed or checked so as to maintain the local
workability and intelligence of cost-benefit analyses of legal rules.
In another respect, however, the pragmatic emphasis in critical
practice is more demanding than the deconstructionist. If the
pragmatist-minded critic is willing to bracket the intelligibility or
coherence of wealth maximization as a goal for law, she is equally
insistent on questioning its aptness. She questions the fit between
wealth and flourishing.
The pragmatically minded critic will harp on characteristic ways
in which economic analysts of legal rules tend toward incompletion
in their practice. She may try to show how analysts in a dominantly
formalist, legalist, privatist, and capitalist culture suppress certain
kinds of, shall we say, obstreperous values.6 0 She may show the
analysts ignoring costs, like disruption of community, that power-
wielders-judges, administrators, consulting experts to lawmakers-
cannot handle according to rule. Perhaps the magnitude of cost is
speculative. Perhaps the "cost" consists of blocking desire that is
beyond price even in theory, let alone practice; for example, desire
for kinds of community that don't reduce desire to the "preferenc-
59 See, e.g., Kelman, Consumption Theoy, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 669 (1979); Spitzer & Hoffman, A Reply to Consumption
Theory, Production Theory, and ideology in the Coase Theorem, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1187 (1980); cf. E. HOFFMAN & M. SPITZER, THE DIVERGENCE BETWEEN WILLINGNESS-
TO-PAY AND WILLINGNESS-TO-AcCEPT MEASURES OF VALUE 42 n.14 (Calif. Inst. of
Tech. Social Science Working Paper No. 755 Nov. 1990) (stating that the authors
"now believe that reliable evidence suggests that Kelman's central intuition may have
been correct").
60 See e.g., Michelman, Ethics, Economics, and the Law of Propery, in NOMOS XXIV:
ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3, 21-24, 33-34 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds.
1982) (doubting the empirical basis for attributions of "preferences" for various
"institutional roles, states, [and] experiences"); Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1878 (1987) (arguing that "[r]easoning in market rhetoric, with its
characterization of everything that people value as monetizable and fungible, tends
to make it easy to ignore... other 'costs'" that are not readily monetizable, such as
personal and community disruption).
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es" of deracinated, disembodied selves having attributes for sale.
The pragmatist will show the distortive effect, in a dominantly
capitalist culture, of reductionist pressure to give "due" consider-
ation to every desire by pricing it.
61
The pragmatic critical practitioner will further show how, in a
dominantly privatist culture, analysts seem either not to notice or
not to care that the "political" processes to which they buck the
obstreperous value issues (including issues ofjustice in distribution)
may very possibly never seriously consider these issues.62  The
result, she will point out, is that their framework does not, in
practice, encourage us to recognize the values that economic
jurisprudes insist (not illogically) that "we" could find ways of
recognizing.
3. Rights and Principles
By rights-centered jurisprudences, we mean those for which a
key to the kingdom of freedom-in-society is universality of recogni-
tion of the worth of persons, institutionally expressed by consistency
in treatment as persons. Such a jurisprudence thus centers on
claims to certain kinds of treatment that an ideal legal order prefers
or entrenches, and the order's modes of defining and attributing
such claims.
From the poststructuralist vantage, all such jurisprudences are
"riven by internal conflict between the demands for abstraction and
for concreteness in legal norms."63 Universality implies transcen-
dence of difference, a reach for consensus. So it requires that an
order's fundamental premises of right be cast at very high levels of
abstraction. But from highly abstract principles of right, convinc-
61 The capitalistic context is what (sometimes) makes the fact of pricing or the fact
of exchange a problematic commodification. See Radin,Justice and the Market Domain,
in NOMOS XXXI: MARKETS ANDJUSTICE 165, 185-86 (J. Pennock &J. Chapman eds.
1989) (arguing that in an ideal world the mere fact that money changes hands need
not undermine personhood and community, although it may do so in the nonideal
world of extensive commodification).62 See, e.g., M. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 9-10, 115-17
(1983) (arguing that the distribution of income is best adjusted through the
government tax and transfer system). But see Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive
Justice, 89 YALE LJ. 472, 498-510 (1980) (arguing that liberal theory's tendency to
prefer taxation to regulation of private exchange as a means of redistribution is
unwarranted).
63 Michelman,Justification (and Justifiability) of Law in a Contradictory World in
NOMOS XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 71, 80 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1986)
(following Kennedy, supra note 51).
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ingly neutral and consisten: treatments of concrete cases cannot be
derived. 4
From this seed grow the distinguished critiques of rights-as
inherently indeterminate or inherently too abstract to do more than
provide rhetorical cover for hegemonic power-produced by writers
like Dalton, 5  Gabel,66  Klare, 7  Olsen,
68  and Tushnet.6 9
These critiques all make use of the antinomy of universality and
consistency-the perception that the abstraction required of
propositions of right by professions of universality forecloses the
prospect of determinate (hence consistent) application to concrete
cases. The critiques move from this perception to the observation
that whatever sense of consistency (hence determinacy) we achieve
in legal applications depends on partisan impositions that belie
universalism. Abstract, universalistic norms require specific
constructions of social reality to make them concretely operative,
say poststructuralist-inspired critics of rights-based jurisprudence.
Those constructions are bound to reflect the partisan interests and
experiences of the powers-that-be.
70
For example, it can be shown that abstract, universalistic
propositions about rights of civil liberty and civil equality yield no
determinate (hence can underwrite no consistent) answer to the
question of government regulation of pornography or racist
speech.71 It follows that those who have confident, "law-like"
64 See Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 874; supra note 5 (quoting Schlag,
Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at 170).
65 See Dalton, supra note 52.
66 See Gabel, The Phenomenolog" ofRights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1563 (1984.).
67 See Klare, The Public/Private Distinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358
(1982).
68 See Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEx. L. REV.
387 (1984).
69 See Tushnet, An Essay On Rights, 62 TEx. L. REV. 1363 (1984) [hereinafter
Tushnet, Essay]; Tushnet, Rights: An Essay in Informal Political Theoy, 17 POL. &
Soc'Y 403 (1989) [hereinafter Tu:,hnet, Rights].
70 See Balkin, supra note 49, at. 761-64.
71 See Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85
NW. U.L. REV. 343, 345-48, 375-83, 386-87 (1991) (describing "indeterminacy" in
classifying racist speech as a "first amendment" or "equality-protecting" problem);
Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The Case of
Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 305-09 (1989); Lawrence, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431,438-49 (arguing
that content-based regulation of racist speech may be constitutionally required in
some circumstances); cf. Grey, Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties: The Case ofDiscriminatoiy
Verbal Harassment (forthcoming Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y (1991)) (presenting pragmatist
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answers to the question produce them out of partisan views of social
relations. In America today, the prevailing, confident answers are
those that privatistically and formalistically construct state power as
tendentiously more dangerous to freedom in general than private or
market power and that legalistically construct contextualizedjudicial
judgment ("balancing") as tendentiously more dangerous than
decision dictated by rule.72 In this way, deconstructive critiques
of rights open the way to seeing how law depends on particular
constructions of social reality to concretize its universalistic
pretensions.
Readers stung by such critiques too often read them as nihilisti-
cally intending their expos6s of structural instabilities in normative
discourses of rights as sufficient refutations of the discourses or
their liberatory potentials. But often one can find in the critiques
a pragmatic as well as a deconstructive side. In the pragmatic
moment of critical practice, one may understand the structural
weakness of a target discourse not as its already fatal flaw, but as its
working interface with surrounding cultural dispositions. 73 One
may then consider whether the discourse is salvageable by work on
those dispositions. 74 When the pragmatic critic's answer is No, as
it sometimes is, 75 no event of nihilism has transpired.
76
approach to hate speech issue which requires accommodation in practice of
incommensurable perspectives).
72 See Michelman, supra note 71, at 309-18.
7 When we are thinkingdcconstructively, domination (supplementarity) appears
immediately in the foreground of thought itself-in thought's (or at any rate
"Western" thought's) irrepressible nature, in the confounding logic of Western
consciousness, in conditions of reflection. Se4 e.g., Balkin, supra note 49, at 747-48
(explaining Derrida's notion of the metaphysics of presence). Turning pragmatic, we
look also to the pre-reflective background, to conditions ("forms") of life. We look to
reflection's traffic with its contingent context, its socio-cultural environment. See
supra notes 56-62; infra notes 77-97 & 122-24 and accompanying text. We see
reflection's crises-conceptual stresses and imminent collapses-as the vortices of that
traffic.
74 See Cover, The Supreme Cour4 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative 97
HARv. L. REv. 4, 10 (1983) ("To live in a legal world requires that one know not only
the precepts, but also their connections to possible and plausible states of affairs.").
15 See, e.g., Tushnet, Essay, supra note 69, at 1371-75,1382-84 (arguing pragmatical-
ly against attempts to rehabilitate rights discourse in prevailing intellectual climate);
Tushnet, Rights, supra note 69, at 412, 422 (same).
76 Whether or not "nihilism" can be pragmatic, compare Stick, Can Nihilism Be
Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1987) with Singer, Legal Realism Now (Book
Review), 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465 (1988) (reviewing L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)), it seems clear that pragmatism cannot be nihilism.
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Of course, the answer may not be No. The trouble with
universalist rights discourse (the pragmatically minded critic might
say), isn't simply structural instability; it is also complacency,
incomplete commitment to go all the way down the emancipatory
path that the discourse opens. 77 More specifically, the trouble is
that complacent rights practitioners in a dominantly privatist-legalist
culture too readily fly from the stresses of public commitment to the
refuge of abstract rule.78 ]n the case of our example, the stress of
public commitment means facing the conundrum of subordination
recycled, universality subverted, through abstract, formal freedom
of speech (the freedom of derogatory utterance that reentrenches
subordination). The refuge of abstract rule means cleaving to
privatistic, formal equality-the absolute ban on state-sanctioned,
content-biased regulation. The pragmatist feels drawn to face the
conundrum and deal with it, perhaps by the use of judgment in
context-"balancing" or "line-drawing.
"79
Thus, in a pragmatist moment of critical legal practice, it will
not necessarily be the discourse of universalism, rather it may be the
cultural context of privatism/legalism that we hold accountable for
tendentiously conservative: abstraction. Pragmatism here means
methodological doubt that the universalistic idea of rights is
necessarily abstracted and removed from the concrete cruelties of the
day. Just as, in a dominantly privatist and legalist environment, the
lazy economist is prone to ignore values that resist monetization and
the lazy doctrinalist suppresses conflicts and gaps, so, in such an
environment, the lazy Rechtslehrer is prone to ignore oppression in the
name of principle.
The passions of rights-critics are not misplaced: people can
discuss abstract freedom and equality forever and never lay a glove
on subordination. Freedom can turn out to mean trading who you
are and what you've got-markets as usual. Free speech can turn out
to mean pornography and racist hate. But it is still possible to think
that the passion should be directed not against the very thought of
77 See Winter, supra note 20, at 1232 ("Rights are about the course of the future,
and that future is made only through the commitments of real people.").
78 See Cover, supra note 74, at 57-59,66-67 (describing the Supreme Courtjustices
deciding Bob Jones University v. United States, 401 U.S. 574 (1983), as "wary and
cautious actors" displaying "some eloquence" but "no commitment").
71 See Michelman, supra note 71, at 308-09, 318-19. But see infra notes 103-05 and
accompanying text (noticing pragmatism's weakness for radical particularism). For
an example of pragmatic line-drawing, see Grey, supra note 71 (proposing narrowly
drawn regulation to deal with ha.te speech on campus).
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rights, but rather at the characteristic failings of nonideal rights
practice in our specific cultural context.
The knowledge of peoples of color, for example, has been that
it is not just legal consciousness but racial consciousness that
supports (among whites) the prevailing power dispensations in
American society. In the experience of peoples of color, the
universalistic idea of rights, indeed the very formalism of the idea,
can become reconstructive.80 It can serve as a probe to the
feeling-or if not to the feeling then to the nerve, to the motiva-
tion-of dominant group members who do not feel the "substantive"
force of expostulations of need,81 or calls for reparation,8 2 com-
ing from people they have learned to see as different and subordi-
nate. The trick is to make dominant society confront itself in the
mirror of its own most idealistic professions.8 3 Pragmatist critical
practice here means seeing the possible effects, in practice and in
context, of the formalism that is a hallmark of the jurisprudence of
rights.
You can then, perhaps, take up where deconstruction sometimes
ends. Deconstructions of rights sometimes end in the knowledge
that abstract rights cannot be rendered concrete without help from
partisan constructions of social reality.84 You adopt that knowl-
edge. You want to use whatever is at hand in the work of dislodg-
ing bad-subordinative-constructions. One of the things at hand is
the abstract, the aspirational, the formal idea of rights.
8 5
80 See Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1357 n.99, 1364-65, 1381-82
(1988); Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals From Deconstructed Rights, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 401, 404-06 (1987).
81 See Crenshaw,supra note 80, at 1341-46; Fraser, TalkingAboutNeeds: Interpretive
Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies, 99 ETHIcs 291, 293-94 (1989).82 See Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections of a Review of CivilRights Literature
132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 566-73 (1984); Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal
Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 372-78 (1987).
83 In Schlag's ironic formulation, the trick is to work "freedom" as a "word for
getting [us] to do what [we] don't want to do." Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go,
supra note 3, at 185. This statement, too, contains its dialectic. What Schlag attacks
is domination by means of pseudo-dialogue. Yet "freedom" used that way also
performatively commits the dominators to the universalist ideal. Sometimes the
effect is counter-subordinative. When it is, irony is doubly served.
84 Our understanding here of deconstruction's contribution to legal criticism
echoes that of Jack Balkin. See Balkin, supra note 49, 744-45, 755, 770 ("[D]econ-
struction of a privileging in a limited area of... doctrine exposes," and invites us to
investigate, "a more pervasive underlying ideology" of "unquestioned... assump-
tions" that inform our doctrine at large.).
85 Note that appealing to rights need not be an alternative to storytelling, see
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4. Dialogism
The jurisprudence of rights pragmatized-colloquialized,
contextualized to conditions of cultural pluralism-shades into the
jurisprudence of dialogue.
Dialogic jurisprudes focus on the search for social conditions,
including cultural understandings of the ideas of law, legality, and
rights, under which collective determinations of aspects of social life
are consistent with personal freedom. They ask how the laws and
rights issuing from dialogic interactions can possibly merit recogni-
tion as self-government that constitutes, reflects, and furthers such
freedom-for all, universally. Jurisprudential dialogism belongs to
a distinct tradition of political-moral thought, "in which noncon-
sensual influences on the self are perceived as coercive invasions of
the autonomy of the subject, to be overcome by" participatory
politics.
86
From the pragmatist vantage, what is the incomplete dialogist's
telltale complacency? Surely, it is overconfidence, unexamined
trust, in the extent to which "we" can all talk meaningfully,
persuasively, and yet nondominatively to each other.8 7  The
complacent dialogist admits social plurality but misgauges its depth.
Maybe she sees a "society" strained by conflicts of interests. Maybe
she does not focus hard enough on those who stand estranged from
this society, this "we," by epistemic distance, by profounder conflicts
of worldviews. Maybe she too readily assumes that all the members
of society share enough in language and self-conception to allow for
undominated dialogue ... if only just up to and not beyond a
certain point.
Such a point might be that of an "overlapping consensus."
Consensus on what? Perhaps on the dangers and evils of pseudo-
dialogic domination, majoritarian or bureaucratic tyranny. Also,
then, on the consequent presumptive prudence of restricting the
state to the promulgation of abstract rules, or to regulating in the
"public" sphere, as its chief or characteristic means for realizing the
Delgado, Stotytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 2411 (1989), but may be an accompaniment.
8 Post, The Relatively Autonomwus Discourse of Law, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF
CULTURE (R. Post ed. forthcoming 1991).
87 See, e.g., Bell & Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE LJ.
1609, 1610-13, 1616 (1988) (arguing that updated versions of republican theory
espoused by Michelman and Sunstein fail to admit the difficulties and dangers posed
by racial domination and estrangement for ideals of dialogic reconciliation).
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basic liberties of persons.88 But what, the pragmatist-minded critic
may ask, has that construct, redolent of privatist-legalist culture, to
say about entrenched racism and sexism speaking through "private"
preferences, or about entrenched poverty based on "private"
markets? How can we hope to approach or preserve a state of
undominated dialogue without concerted assault on such stratifica-
tions?89 Yet how could we mount that concerted assault, with our
politics under prohibition against non-neutral intervention into the
social processes of ideological exchange? 90
From the poststructuralist vantage, on the other hand, dialog-
ism's dilemma is that dialogue (insofar as it is not disguised
coercion) presupposes community; but community is not, finally, a
matter of will or sympathetic exertion but rather is a contingency of
cognitive structures into which we are thrown. 91 Deconstruction
finds in the very idea of self-emancipatory political dialogue a
disturbing conceptual instability: the collapse of conceptual walls
between personal and societal, internal and external, self-active and
compulsive; and the concomitant confusion of persuasion (choice,
freedom) with prescription (necessity, compulsion). The dialogic
idea entails "prescription that specifies in advance the conditions
under which dialogue will count as persuasion rather than coer-
cion."9 2 If this prescription is itself coercion-but what else could
it be?-then how can dialogue be undominated, a medium of self-
emancipation?
To the pragmatist temperament, no such purely conceptual bind
can be terminal to the practical pursuit of democratic, collective
self-government. The pragmatist may still find it right to pursue the
issue of the social and cultural conditions of self-government for
all-universally-through democratic politics. 93 Still, the question
8 See R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY xiv-xv, 63, 84-85,120,198
(1989); Rawls,Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysica 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 223,
225, 228-29, 231, 240-42, 249 (1985).
89 See Winter, Contingency, supra note 3, at 1003-04.
90 See Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminis4 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1699, 1710-11,
1722-25 (1990); see also Michelman, Niae Personal But Not Split: Radin Versus Rorty,
63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1783, 1792-94 (1990).
91 See Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARv. L. REv. 601, 644-
45 (1990); Winter, Contingency, supra note 3, at 966-67, 969-71, 1000-01.
92 Winter, Contingency, supra note 3, at 970. This is the kernel of what has become
a standard objection to the Habermasian notion of an "ideal speech situation." See,
e.g., J.-F. LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE 62-63
(G. Bennington & B. Massumi trans. 1984).
93 See, e.g., Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV.
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left by deconstruction cannot honestly or intelligently be ignored.
Where can we possibly hope to find the unprescribed yet pre-
dialogic "community" required for undominated dialogue?
Following Merleau-Ponty, George Lakoff, and Mark Johnson,
Steven Winter has found a possible common ground of this
prerequisite intersubjectivity in a human commonality of pre-
reflective cognitive structures. 94  It is instructive to see how
circumspectly Winter has had to treat this material. Suppose one
said, simply, that the ground of cognitive intersubjectivity is
physical, and that culture is a strictly subordinate process of
codification and transmission. Then it would seem that "dialogue"
under these conditions could hardly do other than statically
exchange the products of these naturalistically rooted, culturally
codified cognitive structures. The deconstruction of choice/
necessity, of persuasion/prescription, would reappear in phenomen-
ological dress (that is, in appeals to our introspective experiences of
limit, habit, creaturely constitution).
Winter's answer to this phenomenologically modified decon-
struction of persuasion/prescription is, one might say, another
deconstruction: the deconstruction of nature/nurture that appears
in his notion of "slippage." This "slippage" then represents the
possibility of dialogue (not just recycling monologue), given
physique-based cognitive commonality.95 Slippage instigates the
evolutionary rise, in sharply differentiating social environments, of
epistemic plurality. Winter argues, in effect, that in the condition
of postmodernity,96 it is now epistemic pluralism, not monism,
that poses the problem for normative dialogue. The epistemic
distances have grown too great, the ethers too rarified, to allow for
any but the merest slivers of persuasive communication across the
gaping subcultural fissures in our fractured society. Still (we read
Winter as saying), the receding but never completely vanished
physical substrates of cognitive likeness always offer-to those who
1671 (1990) (arguing that democracy is a "precondition for the full application of
intelligence to the solution of social problems").
9 See Winter, supra note 20, at 1129-50. But see Winter, Contingency, supra note
3, at 1002 ("But if [physical embodiment is all that determines these structures],
communication will be very difficult and rudimentary.").
95 See Winter, Contingency, supra note 3, at 996-98. Schlaguses the term "slippage"
in a quite different, quasi-structuralist sense to mark "the diagonal transversal
movement of the same force.., across the conventional reified sectors that mark our
world .... " Schlag, Politics of Forn, supra note 2, at 910.
96 See D. HARVEY, THE CONDITION OF POSTMODERNITY 76-77, 116-17, 302-05
(1989).
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will trouble to understand them-the hope of slowly, laboriously,
inching towards the cognitive community on which undominated
dialogue depends. Winter joins Habermas.97 Poststructuralism
joins pragmatism.
IV. THE POSTSTRUCTURALIST-PRAGMATIST DIALECTIC
We have been distinguishing two ideal-typical aspects-
"poststructuralist" and "pragmatist"-of what we regard as one
critical practice. Now if we look at these two aspects from a
poststructuralist perspective, we can easily see that they cannot be
held apart. The poststructuralist/pragmatist distinction as we
structured it will (as expected) collapse.
When the poststructuralist-minded practitioner observes the
conceptual structures of a discourse, practice, preparatory to
attacking its analytic probity, what does she-what could she-
observe but contingent features of her own discourse? Concepts are
distinguishable by us only relative to discourses in which we
participate (and which participate in us); there is no discourse we
can deconstruct except our own discourse in use at the moment.
But there is no discourse in use except colloquially, by people
sharing some particular form of life. So the poststructuralist critic
is limited to detailed observation, from within a form of life, of
practices embedded in that form of life.9" And as poststructural-
ism is a practice of immanently self-critical reflection, so post-
structuralist critical practice coalesces with pragmatist critical
practice.
Now switch back to the pragmatist moment. When we evaluate
styles of argument in a pragmatist frame of mind, we look for
salient features in use; we look for successes and failures at coping
with the problems that life actually presents. We do not then see
poststructuralist criticism and pragmatist criticism as logically or
inherently separate, but we do see them as representing, as we have
said, different strains of temperament and different moments in
critical practice. When we are practicing pragmatically, we notice
" "[T]heory can locate a gentle but obstinate, a never silent although seldom
redeemed claim to reason, a claim that must be recognized de facto whenever and
wherever there is to be consensual action." J. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATION AND THE
EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 97 (T. McCarthy trans. 1979).
98 Cf. M. WALZER, INTERPRETATION AND SOCIAL CRrITCISM 39 (1987) ("[T]he
outsider can become a social critic only if he manages to get himself inside ... local
practices and arrangements.").
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differences in philosophical temperament, try to take them
seriously, try to hold them apart for long enough to ask what
ramifications they have for our lives.
Structures or discourses that dissolve into each other conceptu-
ally may nevertheless tend in experience to be stubbornly differ-
ent.99 It is not that someone temperamentally inclined towards
deconstruction never looks to how problems are solved in practice,
and it is not that someone temperamentally inclined towards
(re)construction never faces up to structural incoherence. It is just
that in practice we often find that those temperamentally inclined
to poststructuralism emphasize the moves that confound our
categories and shake our certainties, and those temperamentally
inclined to pragmatism emphasize the moves that can function as
ameliorative guidelines for ongoing projects.
In practice, it is useful to separate, sometimes, the poststructur-
alist and pragmatist moments in criticism. (Being of pragmatist
temperament or at least in a pragmatist phase of mind at the
moment, we think so. 100) We are talking about characteristic
leanings, or habits of thought, not about logical necessity or
entailment; but when it comes to thinking about the characteristic
limitations of a discourse as it is used by imperfect practitioners,
distinguishing these habits of thought can be important.
99 See infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text (discussing rules).
100 Since we are speaking here of a dialectic, we should also note how the
pragmatist moment can swing back to the poststructuralist. That switch comes when
the pragmatist sees culture's grip on the characteristic instabilities of a discourse as
relentless enough to count as collapse of the discourse. For example, our account,
above, of the pragmatist critic's cautions to the complacent legal economist, see supra
notes 60-62 and accompanying text, might be taken as deconstructive criticism. Our
account, below, of pragmatist critical caution to complacent pragmatists, see infra
notes 106-11 and accompanying text, presents a more complex case. The charge that
complacent pragmatistjurisprudence entrenches bad coherence is deconstructive, and
it approaches the point of suggesting that the entire discourse together with all its
works is infested with subordinative tendency. Yet it stops short of that point when
it expands the field of pragmatic normative observation from institutional acts to
extra-institutional life and suggesis the destabilizing potential of the incoherence of
actual social life with institutionally professed ideals. See Radin, supra note 90, at
1709-11, 1720-21.
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V. MORE CRITIQUES OF NoRMAnrlvr
New wave assaults on "normative legal thought" so far have
tended to chart their campaigns around the citadel of foundational-
istic grand theory.10 1 So far, they have said relatively little about
legal scholarly normativities that have already crossed over (pro-
fessedly, at any rate) into postmodernist anti-foundationalism: not
only poststructuralism, but also pragmatism and (for the most part)
feminism and critical race theory. It's not that such normativities
are placed beyond any need for critical attention.10 2 It may rather
be that on the map of legal thought mercatorized around formalis-
tic-deductive-prescriptive grand theory, they're Antarctica. Only
dedicated specialists visit Antarctica.
To be spared critical attention is to be ignored. Neglect is not
always benign, although sometimes it is. In other words, there is
always waiting to be made a pragmatic judgment about whether now
is a good time to place feminist jurisprudence, say, or critical race
theory, under critical inspection. AlIjurisprudences have structural
instabilities that poststructuralists could address, and practical
liabilities and limitations that pragmatists could address. It is always
open to question whether addressing them is, at the moment, a
useful thing to do.
Reflecting on this question, we notice an important reason to
work at holding the pragmatic moment in critical practice together
with the poststructuralist one rather than let the two fly asunder
into separate undertakings. There seems to be a consequential
difference between the kind of theoretical checkmate that a "pure"
deconstructive critique can be taken (if often mistakenly) to intend
and the kinds of (re)constructive cautions in practice that occupy
the pragmatic critical moment. Not wishing to demotivate some
insurgent, perhaps congenial, jurisprudential practice, a "pure" post-
structuralist critic might see no other choice but giving that practice
the silent treatment. With a pragmatist moment also in view, the
options may not seem so limited.
101 See supra notes 4-10 & 19-21 and accompanying text.
102 See e.g., Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 888-91 (discussing the failures
of pragmatist and poststructuralist critical practitioners to "examine... the social,
cognitive, and rhetorical scene of their own thought").
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A. Pragmatist Self-Reflection
One weakness to which the pragmatist temperament is prone is
a disabling radical particularism. The nonideal pragmatist, awash
in formalist/legalist culture, too lazily thinks that since rules can't
possibly be what that culture says rules have to be in order to be any
good at all-that is, fact-independently and precontextually opera-
tive-then we had better keep away from rules altogether. From
rejection of the formalist conception of ruleness, the nonideal
pragmatist may leap (unpragmatically) to the conclusion that all
notions of ruleness are misleading, all pretenses of ruleness
misdirected. In other words, she may try to practice the rule that
case-by-case judgment, situated decisionmaking moment by
moment, describes all there is and can be to practical, active
intelligence. She may embrace the rule that attempting to imple-
ment rules is always bad (not useful) and attempting to decide by
case-by-case judgment is always good (useful).
This denial of the possibilities for rules yields a kind of
nominalist intuitionism. What can someone in this stance give as a
reason for her decision other than she just looked out at the world
at the given moment and gokked 03 the answer? How can her acts
and decisions have any aim if there are no generalizations linking
one to another? The radical particularist stance, however tempting
to pragmatists tilting with formalism, is at odds with the pragmatic
spirit of problem-solving for human needs, considered in the
broadest sense. The comptete pragmatist will doubt that unaided
radical particularism can accomplish much good for human
beings.
10 4
Radical particularism is incomplete pragmatism because it shirks
the hard pragmatic work of calibrating ruleness to context. It shirks
consideration of the nature and uses of rules and generalizations,
103 In one of Robert A. Heinlein's mid-century science fiction novels, "grok"
signified a mode of unmediated communication or infallible understanding. See R.
HEINLEIN, STRANGER IN A STRANGE LAND (1961); cf Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over,
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4-14 (discussing "intersubjective zap").
104 Just as pragmatism has a self-critique for excessive rule-skepticism (issuing in
radical particularism), so it has a parallel self-critique for excessive revulsion from
normative "general theories" of law (issuing in radical eclectic normative opportun-
ism). For a good discussion, see Farber & Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1628 (1987) ("Pure eclecticism makes the first
amendment too legalistic, too much the domain of specialized lawyers .... [T]he
first amendment as a whole should stand for something worthy of ultimate commit-
ment.").
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once we know what those are not and cannot be. In a fuller
pragmatic understanding, while rules cannot be hard-and-fast as the
formalist conception supposed, they can be working presumptions
that in practice may be quite hard-and-fast under the circum-
stances.10 5 Presumptively, there are circumstances when hard-
and-fast rules (in the pragmatic sense) will be useful and (relatively)
benign, although no algorithm can decide for us when.
Another weakness that sometimes appears in the work of
mainstream legal pragmatists is taking the status quo for granted.
Unwilling to part with the notion of truth, unable to believe that
truth can possibly consist in thought's correspondence with thought-
independent existence, pragmatists have often repaired to a notion
of truth as coherence. In concept, this means the systemic,
propositional coherence of everything we would right now take as
being the case if we thought about it. In practice, it means the
consistency of a doubted proposition with everything else we
consciously stand ready, right now, to affirm.
1 0 6
For the formalistically acculturated pragmatist jurisprude, the
search for coherence may confine itself to the institutional status
quo, the totality of existing institutions and institutionalized
practices. The search may omit the extra-institutional, cultural
contradictions, the ethical dissatisfactions, the unmet ideals, the
critical visions that also inhabit and enliven our totality. Thus
coherentism may turn into complacent or aggressive conventional-
ity10 7 or traditionality.108  Perhaps the incomplete pragmatist
105 See Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U.L. REV. 781, 795, 804, 806
(1989) (discussing the formalist conception of rules); Schauer, Rules and the Rule of
Law (forthcoming 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y (1991)) (proposing "presumptive
positivism").
106 Note that coherence theory is contested among pragmatists; this may be due
to differing constructions of coherence. See Radin, supra note 90, at 1708 n.26.
107 The difference between complacent and aggressive conventionality shows up
in the dispute between Stanley Fish and Owen Fiss. See e.g., Fiss, Conventionalism, 58
S. CAL. L. REv. 177, 184 (1985) [hereinafter Fiss, Conventionalism] (Fiss explaining
that he and Fish "use the concept of an interpretive community differently-[Fiss sees]
it as a source of authority for the disciplining rules, and Fish sees it as the source of
shared understandings [making disciplining rules unnecessary]."). For the Fish-Fiss
dispute, see Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984); Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
10s See, e.g., 1 F. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT: THE ERRORS OF SOCIALISM ch. 1
(1988) (arguing that traditionally evolved rules of human conduct in selectively
successful civilizations deserve strong presumptive respect); 3 F. HAYEK, LAW,
LEGIsLATION AND LIBERTY: THE POLITICAL ORDER OF A FREE PEOPLE 153-76 (1979)
(same); Michelman, Saving Old Gloiy: On Constitutional Iconography, 42 STAN. L. REV.
1337, 1356-57 (1990) (explaining Hayekian view). But see Kronman, Precedent and
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jurisprude, anxious for coherence, searches where the scholar's
lamp shines brightest, in the archives. Archives collect institutional
acts and decisions; they collect precedents. While precedential,
institutional incoherence perhaps quiets anxiety, arguable ethical
incoherence in life beyond the archives goes unnoticed or at any
rate unremarked.
For example, there is the fact that hierarchies of race and sex
remain cruelly entrenched, economically, socially, and culturally, in
American life. The institutions of law, commending institutional
colorblindness,1 0 9 both proclaim and condone that fact's coher-
ence with the American way. Embracing institutional coherence as
the test of truth and justice, the incomplete legal pragmatist may fail
to see as ethically outrageous (and, indeed, as incoherent with
institutional professions of nondomination) the informal, embed-
ded, trans-institutional oppressions of life in America. She may fail
to consider that these oppressions may well be worse, more unjust,
than the pockets of institutional incoherence that relief of oppres-
sion may really require.
110
This is indeed a serious criticism, because it charges pragmatists
with what in other circumstances can be their salient virtue:
working with trees while bracketing forests. Pragmatists do
recognize that most of the background must be taken as given in
order for the foreground to present itself for work. Yet it is we who
partition the world's features into foreground and background, and
sometimes it is the habitually most taken-for-granted cultural
landscape features that most cry out for redescription. Only by
constant attentiveness to the commonplace can pragmatist critical
practice keep faith with its postmodernist commitments to suspect
facile consensus and pursue epistemic openness.
111
Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1046 (1990) (rejecting the traditionalist view that the
past possesses its own authority).
109 See, e.g., City of Richmond v.J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-96 (1989)
(plurality opinion of O'Connor, J.); id. at 520-21 (Scalia, J., concurring).
110 Even while arguing that legalism is strongly connected tojustice,John Rawls
notes that in a nonideal situation justice may require relaxation of legalist strictures.
SeeJ. RAwLs, A THEORY OFJUSTICE § 38, at 242-43 (1971).
11 See supra notes 86-97 and accompanying text (discussing lazy dialogism).
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B. Feminist Jurispnudence
Feminism, like critical race theory, arises with a critical goal:
showing how other jurisprudences tend to suppress perspectives
that are most at home among those in our society who are not white
men. In their thoroughgoing embrace of epistemic contention,
many feminists and critical race theorists partake of postmodernist-
pragmatist and poststructuralist-critical practice. Feminism and
critical race theory are especially well positioned to drive home the
dangers of coherentist complacency. 112 Conversely, pragmatist
reflection offers in return some cautions for feminism and critical
race theory.
In response to classical doctrinalism and certain traditional
forms of rights theory, many feminists have strongly doubted the
value of a priori, rule-like normative structures as compared with
situated decisionmaking and acknowledgment of the contingencies
of context. Like their pragmatist neighbors, 113 feminists can be
tempted into disabling radical particularism. Moreover, radical
particularism can become especially tempting when feminists adopt
too rigid a rule that rule-like structures are masculine (to be
rejected) and non-rule-like procedures are feminine (to be adopted).
Rule-like procedures are easily identified as belonging to the
"ethic ofjustice," the style of thought in moral decisionmaking that
Carol Gilligan contrasted with the "ethic of care" she found to be
characteristic of mature women. 114 Elaborating on these categories,
112 See Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreward: Justice Engendered, 101
HARV. L. REV. 10, 34-57 (reviewing five complacent assumptions).
113 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
1 14 See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982). The following list may summarize the way the
distinction has come to be understood in feminist thought:
Ethic of Care Ethic ofJustice
nonviolence equality
needs, interests fairness, rights
contextual universal
responsibility, nurture desert, rights
attachment, connection separation, autonomy
community individualism
interdependence independence
cooperation competition
concrete, embedded abstract, universal
perspectival principled
narrative systematic
intuitive logical
emotional rational
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some feminist legal writers have tended to assume that there is
something "essentially" womanly about the ethic of care,11 5 and
something irredeemably masculine about the ethic of justice.
The pragmatist-feminist objects that this essentializing stance
excludes women from a moral tradition that has its redemptive
side; 116 and, moreover, that this exclusion may excessively inhibit
any aspirationally inclusive society from trafficking at all with that
tradition. Perhaps more importantly, the pragmatist-feminist
continues, the essentializing stance tends to entrench a current
cultural understanding of women's limited nature, a cultural
understanding that many women and men find injurious and want
to dissolve. Feminism would thus put itself at odds with its own
pragmatic doubt that current cultural constructions of feminine
"nature" are separable from the detritus of an oppressive ideology
of gender. Worthy and precious as it is, the ethic of care as we
know it may also be a cultural complex of traits useful to a group
existing under oppression..117 Without conceding the indefinite
continuation of women's oppression, we cannot regard such a
complex as essential or peculiar to women.
We mean this as a typical pragmatic caution, not a terminal
deconstruction. The pragmatist-feminist brackets the question of
false consciousness. She sees that for women living in patriarchy,
women's experience of patriarchal life is partially self-constitutive.
She forbears from demanding of women, of herself, the impossible:
the self-destroying regimen of constantly remarking, in one's every
moment of self-fulfillment as woman, the mark, the trace, of
deprivation of self. Not only do those moments of self-fulfillment,
web hierarchy
See Radin, supra note 90, at 1712-13.
115 For discussions and critiques of essentialist feministjurisprudence, see Harris,
Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theoy, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Rhode,
The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and Cultural Change (forthcoming 100
YALE L.J. (1991)).
116 See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (discussing the critique of the
critique of rights).
117 See, e.g., C. MAcKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 39 (1987) (arguing that
Gilligan's "ethic of care" reinforces women's powerlessness); Wells (formerly Hantzis),
Is Gender Justice a Completed Agenda? (Book Review), 100 HARv. L. REV. 690, 700
(1987) (recognizing that because "powerlessness is the central fact of female
experience," certain characteristics are more easily projected onto and internalized
by women); see also Alcoff, Cultural Feminism Versus Post-Structuralism: The Identity
Crisis in Feminist Theory, 13 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC'Y 405, 407 (1988)
(criticizing cultural feminism for "defin[ing] women by their activities and attributes
in the present culture").
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lived in patriarchy, partially constitute identity for women in
patriarchy, they also constitute the beginning (not the end) of
knowledge of a possible better world and determination to strive
towards it. Conventional femininity is where we start, it is what we
have to work with. No pragmatist would want women to detach
thought and action from desire. No pragmatist would want to waste
the concrete knowledge wrought by women living, speaking, finding
voices, under male domination. The pragmatic alternative to waste
and self-defeat is not, however, the exaltation of conventional
femininity into essential womanhood. Rather, it is watchful
receptiveness to redescription. It is the cultivated understanding
that all our old descriptions of the world are always open to
progressive change.
C. Critical Race Theory
Critical race theory is a pursuit of empowerment through
concerted exchange, discipline, consolidation and vocalization of
specially acquired and developed knowledge, in a manner suited to
that knowledge. It is a cultural "nationalist" project of genre
creation.11 8 Its practitioners aim to dislodge cultures of subordi-
nation, or at least build resistance to the damage they do to people's
lives, by synthesizing in legal scholarship the material and moral
experience of subordination from the perspective of the subordinat-
ed.1 19 In creating critical race theory, legal scholars of color have
created a voice of their own that all have reason to hear.120
Needless to say, it is from the perspective of whites to whom critical
race theory is partly addressed that we here speak. From our
118 See Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DuKE L.J. 758, 791-94 ("Against the liberal
image that group identity and status are opposed to ... individual freedom, the
nationalist perspective sees in historical structures the very basis for social meaning.").
119 For example, as Richard Delgado explains:
The cohesiveness that stories bring is part of the strength of the outgroup
.... For many minority persons, the principal instrument of their
subordination is... the prevailing mindset by means of which members of
the dominant group justify the world as it is .... Stories... are powerful
means for destroying mindset-the bundle of presuppositions, received
wisdoms, and shared understandings against a background of which legal
and political discourse takes place.
Delgado, supra note 85, at 2412-13.
120 See id. at 2435-40; Michelman, supra note 90, at 1791. We have already
provided an example: the telling accounts that voice delivers of the ambivalence of
subordinated people's experience of the jurisprudence of rights. See supra notes 80-
82 and accompanying text.
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perspective, there appears to be a pragmatic problem, a double
bind, 12 1 facing critical race theory. From our perspective, the
danger is that of playing into bad old cultural categories of
subordination. The danger lies in the difficulty and delicacy of
judgment, at a given time and place, of the current, local state of
culture among those who in the circumstances have power to make
"cultural meaning" that inflects the self-understandings of others
around them.1 22 How far has the meaning-making community
really progressed towards a cultural pluralist outlook, 123 one that
is nationalistically attuned yet truly destratified?
Behind the work of critical race theorists lies bitter knowledge
of the depth of entrenchment of stratified cultural categories, and
so for them there must always still be the question of whether
stratification here, now, remains entrenched in such a way as to turn
cultural nationalism against itself. For example: Where stratifica-
tion remains deep-where the prereflective common ground of
undominated dialogue is thin, remote, and uncertain 124 -scholarly
accentuations of group identity may be heard as suggestions that
faculty candidates of color ought be judged, in part, by conformity
to a cultural mode that someone constructs as, say, Black. Under
present conditions in legal academia, with very few exceptions, any
such constructions will come from the minds of (predominantly
white) people in "predominantly white" (which is to say white, not
yet multicultural) social settings. Moreover, those minds-our
minds-cannot be unambiguously, securely proof against the virus,
the heritage, of patronage. It seems that inviting us to say who is
and who is not culturally "of color," as we go about (re)populating
our institutions, should not routinely be considered a sure and safe
path toward desubordination.
121 See Radin, Affirmative Action Rhetoric (forthcoming 8 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y
(1991)).
122 See Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning With Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 321 (1987). Many scholars of color argue (we find
compellingly) that, in American society, belonging to a group that is culturally
identified, qua group, as not-white is a special experience that may yield perspectives
warranting the most serious attention from all. See e.g., Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320 (1989). At the
same time, scholars of color argue (also compellingly) that sometimes, at least,
accentuation of group membership just envenoms the sting of subordination. See,
e.g., Carter, The Best Black, and Other Tales, RECONSTRUCTION, Winter 1990, at 6.
123 See Kennedy, A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal Academia,
1990 DuKE L.J. 705, 757.
124 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
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D. Poststructuralism
Taken unpragmatically, deconstruction may look like a critical
practice that cannot be trained inward upon itself and live to tell the
tale. That observation would certainly not mean that poststructur-
alist critical practitioners cannot critically reflect on their own
practice. Rather, it might mean that when they do, they do so
pragmatically. (For us, a memorable and telling example is Schlag's
pragmatic refusal to be silenced by the charge of performative
contradiction.1 25 ) Here we offer some additional specifics of
pragmatist caution to poststructuralist practice.
Against which characteristic errors or biases would pragmatist
critics want to warn poststructuralists (including themselves when
they are being poststructuralists)? Two present in our legal-
academic context are the dangers of (1) inapt structuralism and (2)
skeptical paralysis.
If a strength of deconstruction is to disabuse us of rigid
dichotomies, a corresponding danger is to see (construct) rigid
dichotomies in places where our discourse is saliently more
complex, more "continuum-ized." Deconstruction itself maps
structure onto the thought it deconstructs, rendering that thought
into bimodal categorical form.1 2 6  It is good to put bimodal
categories to the test where these exist in our discourse, 127 but
deconstruction may be less useful if applied where usage is already
less bimodal. In some cases, in other words, deconstruction may
obscure rather than clarify our situation vis-4-vis our own discourse.
An example may be seen in recent debates over rules and rule-
following. It seems that incomplete poststructuralism muddies the
waters by entrenching-even while deconstructing, and indeed in
order to deconstruct-an overconfident distinction between "rules"
and "standards." The pragmatic point of deconstructing a rules/
standards distinction is of course to help us see that indeed these
cannot be distinct and rigid categories. But under the circumstanc-
125 See Schlag, The Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 925 ("[W]here don't you go,
what do you miss, if you keep trying to avoid performative contradictions?"); see also
id. at 888-93 (pointing out how legal pragmatists and deconstructionists fail to
examine the academic institutional-cultural contexts and determinants of their own
practices); supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
126 See Balkin, supra note 49, at 746 ("Described in its simplest form, the
deconstructionist project involves the identification of hierarchical oppositions,
followed by a temporary reversal of the hierarchy.").
127 See e.g., Schlag, Politics of Forra, supra note 2, at 826-28 (deconstructing the
opposition of "technical "doctrinalist" and "moralist" jurisprudence).
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es, it may be possible simply to observe our discourse carefully and
notice that these categories already do not seem rigid to us.
Pragmatically, we do not need to create a binary opposition in order
to disabuse ourselves of it. Moreover, the attribution of a binary
opposition tends to reinscribe the traditional philosophical view that
there is, indeed, a "logical" distinction between "rules" and other
kinds of directives addressed to agents. The more useful post-
Wittgensteinian position, and the better way to deny the existence
of any such "logical" distinction, is to understand our discourse and
activities involving rules and rule-oriented behavior as distributed
along a continuum.
128
Another sort of incompletion to which poststructuralist practice
is liable ends in skeptical loss of valuational focus or political
direction. Deconstruction as an "edifying" discourse has been used
in the service of emancipatory social change. For example, when it
is shown that the feminine, as a dangerous supplement to the
masculine, cannot be held outside, but is always already inside the
masculine, 129 then this, the poststructuralist critic reasonably
hopes, will help us stop privileging the masculine. But there is
nothing that could make deconstruction "by its nature" progressive.
Anything can be privileged, and anything can be deconstructed.
Some of the conceptions we privilege may be good (in their places)
and some may be bad, but this is not something deconstruction can
tell us; from inside the deconstructive perspective, characterizations
of one conception or another as "good" or "bad" are not coherently
understandable except as more fodder for deconstruction.
Deconstruction can open the way to new understandings and hence
social change, but it cannot help to guide the direction of change or
say whether change (however guided) will be for the "better" or
"worse."1 30 Each new understanding can be deconstructed with
the very same vigor as the one it replaces.
Of course, something must be privileged for deconstruction to
take place. Something must be privileged if we are to speak and
understand each other, if we are to understand the deconstructer as
saying something. We must assume a common language, and
common language must have some fixed points-some points we
128 See F. SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULE-BASED DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (forthcoming 1991).
129 See, e.g., T. EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 132-33 (1983)
(deconstructing the man/woman opposition).
130 Seesupra notes 73-85 and accompanying text (critiquing the critique of rights).
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select (or have had selected for us) as fixed points, even if we fail to
notice the selection happening. Poststructuralists are often
ironically aware of how they willy-nilly reflect such selections as they
write, and how their readers do the same as they read.131 Yet the
imperfect poststructuralist may suppress this ever-present irony.
She can forget sometimes that, in her own very act of writing, the
same kind of privileging that she deconstructs in others must always
already be going on in order to enable her to write-or even to be.
So, imperfect poststructuralist writing can tend to be self-
privileging. This failing can extend to the privileging of the
methodology itself. Like the skeptic who forgets to be skeptical
about the "truth" of skepticism, the poststructuralist-minded critic
may lapse rhetorically into implying that there is something good or
right about deconstruction itself, privileging deconstruction, making
it foundational.
13 2
Suchimplications risk not only communicative misunderstand-
ing,13 but dissipation of reformist political will. A conception of
politics in which it is intelligible for politics to be "progressive," to
aspire to creation of communities that empower human beings, is
hard to couple with a conception of politics that cannot make sense
of a commitment to work toward a vision of a better future. To
sustain political motivation, better reason must exist to dislodge the
status quo than the mere fact that it is the status quo. That better
reason can only be our vision of a better future; yet no vision can
motivate if it always arrives already (atemporally, foundationally,
irreparably, terminally) deconstructed. 3 4
IV. CONCLUSION: TOWARD (RE)CONSTRUCTION
We have just been speaking of poststructuralism as a critical
practice of, and in, legal scholarship. Let us say there is in our
world a cultural space occupied by what we all know as law and legal
ordering. By and large, legal scholarly antagonists of various
normativities in legal thought simply cannot be construed as calling
for an evacuation, or a surrender to others, or a closing down of the
legal-cultural space. Their work cannot be construed as bespeaking
131 See, e.g., Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at 843 ("Normative
legal thought enables, shapes, and distorts all legal thought, including [this article].").1 32 Seesupra notes 48-49 and accompanying text; infra note 137 and accompanying
text.
133 See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
134 See infra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
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the cessation of efforts to achieve goals through activities located
within-filling-that space; rather, their productions exemplify
critical work within that space, or work on redefining its bound-
aries. 135 Many critics of one or another normative jurisprudence
evidently mean to reject the jurisprudence(s) they criticize in favor
Of some other, perhaps too hastily deemed exempt from critique by
virtue of, say, its postmodernist commitments to anti-foundational-
ism, immanence, historicity, and epistemic struggle. Perhaps, for
example, they reject classical doctrinalism or dialogism in favor of
pragmatism, or feminism, or critical race theory.
Other critical practitioners evidently try to abstain from
commitment to any jurisprudence and devote themselves abstemi-
ously to excavating the hidden, mystifying, self-enclosing, but also
self-liquidating, structures they know (and so do we) they can find
in every candidate jurisprudence that comes along.1 3 6 We think
even their practice cannot be non-normative in the broadest sense
in which some of them use the term, because (as we explained in
Parts I and II) no discursive utterance-and in particular no
argument-can be seriously entertained as non-normative in so
broad a sense. Still, these most fastidious critical practitioners
apparently try to refrain from ever saying explicitly that there is
anything we ought to do; they confine their arguments to assault on
(other) normative frameworks. Are their arguments, then, perhaps
non-normative in a pragmatic sense, since they refrain from inviting
us to do anything (except engage with them)?
15 See Schlag, Politics of Fonm, supra note 2, at 843 (placing inside the force field
of the system of normative legal thought "that sort of thought which (like this very
article) seems so far removed, so distant from the paradigmatic case"). Of course,
there has been a good deal of heartfelt protest over the recent critical-theoretical turn
in the scholarly devotions of the employees of law schools. But the authors in this
symposium obviously don't want to be understood as reading critical legal scholarship
out of the canon of the properly legal. Insofar as by "normativity" in legal thought
they might be taken to mean the legalism of that thought, they still must mean to
allow for legal scholarship that is; counter-legal, anti-legal, beyond or against the
conventions of the going-concern discipline of law (as those are presented, for
example, in Fiss, Conventionalism, aupra note 107, at 194-95 (1985); Fiss, The Death of
the Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 9-13 (1986)). They mean to insist that such counter-
legal(ist) normativities fall within, rather than without, the field of "legal" scholarship.
They are not offering to abandon the field of legal work-their field, our field-to the
legalist adversary. Obviously, law professors will speak more effectively if perceived
as doing law controversially than if perceived as not doing law.
136 See e.g., Schlag, Politics of Form, supra note 2, at 932 ("[This article is] an
attempt to help destabilize normative legal thought.... [T]his process is not pleasant
.... [But i]t happens all the time.... It's the law.").
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It has, after all, been said by way of explaining such a deter-
minedly negative practice that it is just, well, fun.18 7  But of
course that is rarely, if ever, all that's said or intimated by way of
explanation. The more satisfying explanation, the explanation that
allows this critical practice to retain its momentum and its audience,
is different. It is pragmatic. (Of course, it is poststructuralist, too.)
And it is normative. It is the belief-the situated judgment-that
under current conditions, normative projects are bound to the
reproduction of evil until relentless application of the negative can
break the grip on our acculturated imaginations of a particular,
historically situated, pernicious world-view.
1 38
Thus understood, anti-normativism is not foundational; it is only
temporarily and not atemporally privileged. Thus understood, anti-
normativism is a pragmatically inflected project. Those who still
attack all jurisprudences and embrace none must be judging in
context that the moment for reconstruction is not yet here. When
and for whomever that moment does arrive, the conceptual truth
that each and every normative project is liable to deconstruction no
longer works as a foundational objection against engagement in
such projects; it becomes just one more problem to be understood
and negotiated.139 When and for whomever that moment comes,
the perpetual anticipation of mockery no longer counts as a reason
137 See Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE LJ. 1229,
1230 (1981) ("[T]rashing is fun. I love trashing...
138 See e.g., id. at 1230-31 (explaining that "the point" of trashing is exposure of
possible notions of justice better than the currently prevailing "abstract, rightsy,
traditional, bourgeois" notion); Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at
181 (presenting deconstruction of normative legal thought as a project of "disen-
chantment"); id. at 188 (stating that "[u]ntil normative legal thought begins to deal
with its own paradoxical postmodern rhetorical situation, it will remain ... an
irresponsible enterprise").
139 In the following passage, substitute anti-normativists for sentimentalists/
utopians and substitute pragmatist (hell, substitute normative) legal thought for
positive theory of law:
[N]ote should be taken of the unhappy fate of natural-law doctrines and
assorted other excursions into "revolutionary" legal theory. The revolution-
arybourgeoisie... counterposed natural-law doctrines to feudal theory but
once in power rushed to embrace a positive theory of law .... However
much sentimentalists and utopians may rail at the monotonous recurrence
of a positive theory of law whenever revolutionaries settle down to rebuild
the world they have shattered, any other course would be doomed to failure.
E. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN ROLL: THE WoRLD THE SLAvFs MADE 26 (1972).
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to quit.140 It remains, of course-an ambiguity that we live with,
a risk that we take.
It seems a possibility worth considering that there is not, and is
not going to be, any critical speaker for whom the reconstructive,
the visionary, the committed moment is not always already coming,
and thus is not always already here.141 We can deconstruct
because we can reconstruct; we are anti-normative insofar as we are
normative. As the reconstructive moment seems ineradicable, so
too does the human experience of agency. It seems, in other words,
a possibility worth considering that the problematic, elusive,
"humanist" experience of subjectivity-agency-is an historically
irreversible, inexpungible, constitutive aspect of our experience of
(human) being. Part of what we do, as concept-making strivers
caught in forms of life, is think about the good-the better-world
and ourselves acting towards it. We cannot deny our own agency.
(We cannot speak the sentence of denial except as speaking subjects,
affirming by speaking the sentence what the sentence means to
deny.) We can call agency into question, and we had better, but to
call into question is also to (re)affirm, (re)create, (re)construct.
140 See Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, supra note 3, at 167 ("[H]is
unmistakably derisive tone indicated that [being a 'liberal humanist'] was not
something I was supposed to like. So I quit .... ").
141 "Only selves can put the self in question-there is literally no one else to do it.
And only selves with preexisting commitments (political or otherwise) would engage
in such a project." Balkin, Tradition, Betraya4 and the Politics of Deconstruction, 11
CARDozo L. REV. 1613, 1629 (1990); cf H. PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY
162-63 (1981) (presenting pragmatist arguments that refute skepticism and relativism
on the grounds that they are self-defeating).
